This paper proposes a reassesment of Ramon Llullos thought in the history of philosophy. A previous reconsideration of the history of medieval thought is required. The author refuses a finalist interpretation of the Christian thought that reduces the ~rationalistn slant of Ansel~n and the Victorines to a philosophical moment overpassed, even buried, by Thomist criticisms. Therefore, he recognizes in the Anselmian stream a philosophical tradition of its own, historically transcending the Middle Ages and becoming one of the principal sources of Renaissance metaphysics. By reeenacting and transforming the terms of that current, R. Llull became one of its most decisive components.
Ramon Llull and the History of Christian Philosophy
In our histories of medieval thought we have concentrated on the history of Christian philosophy during the centuries which separated Augustine from Luther. Because Christian philosophy was meant to provide the praeambula to the acceptance of revelation, we have attended prirnarily to the history of rnetaphysics, ethics, and rational psychology. We have focused, above all, on the philosophical developments in Paris and Oxford which were so closely related to the evolution of Scholastic theology. As a result, we have failed to recognize sorne of the greatest achievernents of medieval science -achievements in rnathematics and natural philosophy, in the theory of the state and in the theory of what science itself is. Our paradigm has forced us to regard what is known as Averroism as an aberration and the fourteenth century as the end of a joumey. We have no organic place in our histories for figures like the Englishman Roger Bacon, the Italian Pietro d'Abano, and the Catalan Arnau de Vilanova and even for such significant personalities as Dante Alighieri and Nicolaus Cusanus. In this essay 1 would like to outline the philosophical contribution of an author who has suffered much from the narrow scope of our current account: the Majorcan Ramon Llull.
Around the beginning of the twelfth century in the temtories bordering on Islam -in Catalonia and in the kingdorns of Toledo and Sicily-there appeared a conception of knowledge and reality which opened a new period in the history of thought. The commerce and trade which flourished in the of educational institution, different from the Latin universities of Paris and Oxford, in which a true dialogue between the three great mediterranean civilisations might be possible. In repeated petitions to popes and kings he pleaded for the foundation of colleges in which men prepared to die for their faith might learn the languages and doctrine necessary for preaching to Saracens and Jews.
Although he was and remained a layman, Llull decided to dedicate his life to a missionary apostolate. To this end he planned at first to go to Paris to leam Latin and scholastic theology. He was advised, however, by Ramon de Penyafort -the same superior of the Dominican Order whose inspiration stood behind the Contra gentiles of Thomas Aquinas-to return to his native Majorca, where he could leam not only Latin but also Arabic and something of Moslem thought.
Llull not only mastered the Arabic language, but also conceived the idea of a new science which would serve high missionary purpose. This new science was based on both Latin and Arabic models. But because it was addressed to peoples of al1 faiths, it was not to be specifically theological, but rather a general science which could be applied to al1 the particular sciences of the time. Llull changed, therefore, the name of his Ars inveiziendi veritatem to Ars generalis and submitted the work to constant revision throughout his long life.
Ramon Llull: Arabicus Christianus
Toward the end of the eleventh century the increasing contacts between the three great Mediterranean civilizations gave birth in the Latin West to a fundamentally new conception of knowledge and nature. This new conception took different forms in different pIaces and in different thinkers, but it was characterized, above all, by its dynamic understanding of reality. Impressed by the superiority of Islamic science, Western thinkers made an enormous effort not only to appropriate the results of Greek and Arabic leaming, but also to develop a standpoint which would enable the Latins to appear as an equal partner in philosophical and theological discussion. This standpoint they found in the view that al1 reality tended actively toward the infinite. The id quo maius cogitari nequit of Anselm of Canterbury is but one aspect of this new vision. Fundamentally, the Platonism of the twelfth-century school of Chartres, the understanding of the artes nlechanicae as aiming at the transformation of reality, the thirteenth-century science of optics, the linguistic and mathematical analysis of questions of continuity and the infinite, the fourteenth-century notion of the latrtudo formarum, Albertist epistemology, the questioning of the geocentric hypothesis, and the new conceptions of science itself which appeared during the fifteenth century are al1 aspects of the same vision -aspects which have been consistently ignored in our histories of Christian philosophy.
Behind the general science which Llull thought of as applicable to al1 the sciences there lay the fundamental vision of a natural theology which should approach the true God through a method of contemplation. on the divine names.
Llull called these names «dignities» or «axioms» and listed in the final form of the art nine of them: goodness, greatness, eternity; power, wisdom, love; virtue, truth and glory.
His idea seems to have been based on an Islamic method of contemplation which attempted to ascend by way of created reflections of the divine perfections to the infinite perfection which is God himself. He tliought that through contemplation on combinations of these names, which are common to al1 religions, agreement could be reached between Mosle~ns and Jews, Greek and Latin Christians.
One recognises the Neoplatonic axiom, Bonunz est diffusiivun~ sui, behind «goodness» as the first of the dignities. 'The second group of three div' 'ine names was possibly suggested by the Latin triad of yotestas, sapientiu, benigtzirus, common in the twelfth century. The inclusion of «greatness» ainong the principles shows very clearly however that Llull has gone beyond the static categories of ancient Neoplatonism and made Anselm of Canterbury's id quo maius cogituri nequit his point of departure.
Llull's inspiration for the way in which these names are to be understood seems at the same time to have been influenced by Islamic mystical writers. He composed a Liber de centunz nominibus Dei in which he tells us that the Moslems believe that God has placed even more power in his names than in animals, plants and precious stones. His method of contemplation can therefore only be understood correctly if we take the dignities to stand for active powers. He insisted that we must refer al1 the powers which they designate to the supreme power of God, who created al1 things.
Accordingly, Llull developed his method of contemplation not only by spelling out -honzontally, so to speak-nine different names of God, but also by making explicit -verticallythree degrees of the powers of the names. He conceived his Art as a means of ascent which proceeds by way of two stages, a transcending of sense-knowledge by an ascent from the positive to the comparative degree of the dignities (bonum-melius) and a transcending of rational knowledge by an ascent from the comparative to the superlative degree (melius-optimum).
Llull argued that sense perception cannot form a valid basis for science; it remains on the lowest, positive level of knowledge. Reason can, however, rise to the comparative level in that it attains rational knowledge of these sensible objects. Aristotle and Averroes attained this level. But this level is still not the level of true science. If the objects of the sense world are good and great, the objects of the rational world are better and greater. But God is with respect to al1 creatures the best and greatest -optimum et maximum. Only through a second ascent, therefore, can the intellect attain the level of eterna1 truth.
On this superlative level the differences we had encountered on the first two levels disappear. Because God is the best in the superlative degree, it is no longer possible to distinguish him as such from the greatest or the most powerful. At the superlative degree of reality the mystic dia'covers the supreme being in whom al1 the divine names coincide or fa11 together.
Ramon Llull: Philosophe de l'action
Two Latin mottoes characterize two divergent approaches to the medieval problem of the relationship between faith and science. Anselm's device, fides quaerens intellectum camed the day in the twelfth century. Thinkers like Hugo of St. Victor and Alain de Lille sought rationes necessariae for the doctrines of the faith. But at the beginning of the thirteenth century a new device appeared on the field, the motto, fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet experinzentum, of Pope Gregory IX. Anselm's idea -which has been senously misinterpreted by the histonans of Christian philosophy-was formulated in the context of the dialogue between the three great mediterranean religions. The new papa1 device represented a narrowing of the European vision. It was this device that implied the separation of theology from philosophy. Philosophy was assigned the task of providing reasons for the acceptance of a body of doctrinenot for the doctnnes themselves. The history of this approach is well known. It is the history of the Christian philosophy which we have written. Anselm's approach did not however remain submerged. It surfaced again in different guises in the early fourteenth century.
In his works Llull sought above al1 to render intelligible the Christian doctrine on which al1 missionary intent had foundered, the doctrine of the Trinity. For this purpose he had recourse to an analysis of what it means when we say that the powers of the divine names are active. He held that we cannot truly cal1 something good which does not produce a good.
In this way Llull introduced a completely new category in the history of metaphysics. In accordance with his apologetic purpose he spoke not only of pnnciples of being, but also of principies of action. He proposed the thesis not only that God is productive contingenter and ad extra in creation, but also that the divine persons are productive necessarie and ad intra.
Taking his point of departure from the dynamism which his Islamic partners in dialogue admitted, the dynamism of the process of knowledge (the knowing intellect, the known object, and the act of knowledge) and love (the lover, the beloved, and love itself), Llull maintained that we must admit the activity of al1 the divine perfections. True goodness must produce something good; true greatness must produce something great.
Because action presupposes a principle or source, that which is produced, and a bond between them, he spoke not only of the dignities, but also of their acts and the «correlatives» of their action. To designate these correlatives, he formed new words which appear strange in Latin and were probably formed on the analogy of the forms of the Arabic verb. In a sermon given in Tunis he explain: Actus.. . bonitatis dico bonificativum, bonificabile, bonificare; actus etiam magnitudinis sunt magnificativum, magnificabile, magnificare; et sic de aliis ornnibus divinis dignitatibus.
Llull generalised this idea to the extent that he could speak even of the abstract moments of activity as -tivum, -bile and -are. He defined these moments as substantial and intrinsic principles of action which are valid for al1 reality. In this way he was able to recognise images of the triune God in al1 aspects of the created world, in the form, matter and conjunction which make up corporeal things; in the form, subject and property which constitute the nature of the angels; and even in the three dimensions of bodies and the two premisses and one conclusion of the syllogism. Above al1 in the union. Syllogism -above al1 in the union of knower and person known in the act of mystical knowledge and in the union of a lover and a beloved bound together in the active love. A lover and a beloved bound together in true active love.
Llull was aided in his apologetic purpose by the analysis of the knowledge of the illuminated mystic current among some Moslem thinkers. Certain Christian controversialists writing in Arabic had taken up as an analogy for the Trinity Aristotle's description of God as vóqots votocws, as it had been expanded in Neoplatonism from two to three terms. Some Moslem writers accepted this idea for the mystical knowledge of God in which the knower, the object known and the act of knowing itself are one.
Llull was able to join this analogy with Augustine's famous comparison of the Trinity with human love. In his De amic e amut, a charming little book which is one of the great glories of the Catalan language, Llull maintained that true, active love presupposes a lover, the beloved, and the love itself which unites them.
Because the correlative principles are intrinsic to al1 activity, action and passion are not, as in Aristotle, accidental. For Llull, being and activity both belong to the substance of things and are identical.
Because activity implies relatedness, Llull added, in the later forms of the Art, nine relative dignities to the absolute ones listed earlier: difference, contrariety, concordance; greaterness, lesserness, equality; beginning, middle and end; «contrariety», «greaterness» and «lesserness» are encountered in the created world, but on the superlative leve1 of the divine activity there remain only «difference», «equality» and «concordante».
The infinitely great, divine optimans can only produce the divine optimatunz which is its «equal»; the «difference» between them being necessarily transcended in the «concordante» of the divine optimare, while al1 three together form the «beginning», «middle» and «end» of al1 things.
In the sermon quoted above Llull made clear the relationship of his dynamic understanding of reality to the chartrain triad of unitas, aequalitas arzd connexio. He concluded: Thus for Llull the correlative unfolding of al1 things became an absolute ontological principle. Even the divine unity known through faith must be structured. As an active unity it must have a moment which is to be united. If God is truly one in an active sense of the word, he must be triune, even though on the superlative leve1 of the divine activity the manner in which God is triune eludes man's understanding.
Having thus discovered the Christian Trinity in the mediated unity of the most simple divine essence, Llull also sought, by means of the dynamic dignities of his Art, to make intelligible the doctrine, known to Christians by faith, of the lncarnation of Christ. To this purpose he appealed to the distinction between the necessary activity of the dignities ad intra, and their contingent activity ad extra. Whereas the divine activity ad intra is necessary, the creation of the world ad extra is dependent on the divine will. But when God has freely chosen the creation of the world, the infinite first cause can only achieve concord with its effect:
In Filii Dei incarnatione, per participationem scilicet unionis creatoris et creaturae in una persona Christi.
Aristotle's theory of science, which begins with self-evident principles in order to present a body of doctrine deductively, was well suited to the thirteenth-century idea of the relation between faith and reason. The articles of faith could be taken as the first principles for a Summa of theology. The Anselmian approach implied a different theory of science -a theory of a science which ascends beyond al1 hypotheses and principles to the one presuppositionless beginning of al1 knowledge and al1 reality. The opposition between two approaches should not be understood simply as an opposition between Aristotelianism and Platonism. Thirteenth-century Aristotelians were able to fit many Neoplatonic ideas into their syntheses since they were easily adaptable to the idea of the theologians that Adam's fa11 darkened man's intellect and weakened his will. The often proclaimed great thirteenth-century synthesis between Platonism and Aristotelianism was in fact the result of the desire to show not only that revelation is in accord with reason, but also that it is necessary, since man's nature is a fallen nature. The approach of Anselm of Canterbury represented rather something completely new in the history of philosophy. In accordance with his idea, some fourteenth-century thinkers saw creation and man's place in it more optimistically. Their views implied the abandonment of the hierarchical division of nature into supra-and sub-lunary realms and saw the earth not as the lowest of a series of necessary emanations, but as a noble star, differing only in brilliance from the other stars of the heavens .
Applying his ideas to the creation of the world, Llull strongly emphasized not only the dynamic character of God' s causal action, but also that of its effect, the created world itself. He applied the distinction between necessary activity ad itztra and contingent activity ad extra to the activity of creatures. To explain how the distinction applies to creaturely activity, he employed the example of a property in a subject.
Fire, for example, must necessarily burn, but whether it heats water or burns wood is contingent. Within itself fire is active «substantially» and «in a proper way»; in water or earth it is active «accidentally» and «in an appropriated way». The form of whiteness is active within itself? but when it contingently whitens (albificut ) this or that body, it is present in the body in a «contracted» way.
For Llull therefore creation is a likeness of God because of its dynamic character. Not only does God's activity of creation not cease with the bestowal of being on the world, but the world which God has treated is itself active. tending to its own perfection.
Just as whiteness can seek to increment its contract perfection in an appropiated way, by whitening more and more individual bodies, so also the creator has so created the various species that they tend to increase their perfection by numerical multiplication.
Although the particular, individual things of which the world is made up are in process tending toward perfection, no individual thing can attain the full perfection of its species. The species is the limit to which the perfection of the individual approaches, the genus that of the species, the universe that of the genera.
Llull understood the individuals, species and genera which we encounter in the world as parts of a whole, as components of a unity reflecting the dynamic greatness of the creator. He presented his understanding of this whole -this universe-most clearly in his epoch-making Liber chaos, a work which he appended to the second redaction of his Art, the Ars demonstrativa.
In this work Llull broke with the medieval idea of a Stufenkosnzos. He gives no account of the heavenly spheres and their angelic movers, but focused his attention rather on the sublunary world of the four elements. His book understands chaos neither as a primordial void in the sense of disorder and confusion nor as materia informis in the sense of the Augustinian theology of creation.
For Llull chaos is rather the complex of al1 the things which were created by God in a unique act, together with al1 the determinations categorizing them. Chaos contains the semina causalia whith are the grounds for al1 things, the forma universalia and the materia universalis, the genera and species, the substantiae and accidentia. From chaos proceeds everything which is beneath the sphere of the moon. In the semina causalia of chaos al1 the individual transmutntiones, al1 the various possibilities of individual development, are already present. The transmutations of chaos do not affect its essence. They are rather various actualizations of that which is already present in chaos in potentia.
In his conception of chaos Llull thus brought together a great many different ideas from the philosophical tradition. He divided chaos into three degrees. In the first degree we find the rationes semirzales of the Stoics in the role of a genus for both the Platonic notion of a world soul and the Anstotelian predicables and categories. In the second degree we find the first individuals of the particular species, in the third al1 the individuals deriving from these first ones.
But Llull's use of these ideas completely transformed their meaning. The Platonic idea of an anima mundi is associated with the Anstotelian doctrine of matter and form, but understood in terms of the Llullian correlatives of action. Chaos is made up of the four abstract essences of the four elements: igneitus, aeritas aqueitas, teneitas. Each essence has its proper correlatives, its proper form (ignificutii,um), its proper matter (ignificabile) and its proper act (igiiificare).
The matter and form of the various individuals in chaos should not be thought of as limited to the individuals Al1 the proper forms are pined together in a unique foi.ma uiiiversalis -a Corpus mundi -which is the total sum of al1 the possible (-bilia). Taken together, this universal form and this universal matter make up the urium esse, the uizunz suppositunz, which Llull calls chaos.
From the universal form and universal inatter emerge the genera and species, substances and accidents, and from them in tum the individual things composed of particular forms and matters. Each particular form and each particular matter is grounded in the universal form and matter. In accordance with his doctrine of relative principies Llull understood the second degree of chaos as mediating between the original sei?zina causalia and the final perfection which the individuals find in their numerical multiplication.
But the concrete individual things which emerge from the seniiila causalia tend not only to their extnnsic, numerical multiplication. They tend also to their intrinsic, proper perfection. By nature each concrete thing strives to fulfill the abstract essence from which it has emerged. It was in this sense that Llull maintained that the categories and predicables and the union of universal form and universal matter are real things. The abstract is already really present in individual things as the limit of their, striving toward infinity.
In his Libel de natura, a treatise which is intimately connected with the final redaction of Art, Llull defined nature as the principle through which the entia concrcta -the individual man (horno), for example -approach ever more closely the entia abstracta-the essence of man (hunzmlitus).
For this reason Llull could adopt the Neoplatonic idea of nature as the \lis ailimae unii~ersalis which is the tliird emanation from the One. In the Ars genelzlis ultima he described nature as the essentia in suo riaturuli concreto sLrsterltata et iliota per actuni naturaleni. Accordingly, he thought of the essences of things as vires, as powers which are moved by the natures in them. At each degree of their return to the original unity the respective -tiva form the i~atui.a natui.arzs, the respective -bilia the natu1.a naturata, and the respective -are the union of both.
In this way chaos taken as a whole can be understood as the reflection of the divine nature whose dynamism unfolds in a threefold natura, a rzatura iiutui.ans, u natura naturata arld a nuturu naturare.
From Anselm's Maxiinum to the Dignitas hominis of the Renaissance
The two divergent conceptions of knowledge and reality which ran in parallel currents through the entire medieval penod came into open conflict over the nature of man. The conflict reached its high point in the debates conceming the nature of Christ and the necessity of the Incamation. The course the conflict took has been obscured by the fact that Scholasticism distinguished Christian philosophy from theology and regarded christological questions as belonging exclusively to a supernatural theology. But the medieval christological debates did not concem simply the question of the nature of Christ. At a more profound level, they were at so discussions about the nature of rnan himself -about the maximum of which he is capable. Because the proponents of the distinction between Christian philosophy and theology wanted to underline the necessity of revelation consequent upon Adam's fall, they regarded the Incarnation of Christ as only contingently necessary, that is, as necessary only to repair the damage done to man's nature through original sin. But outside strictly Scholastic circles -and even in some circles generally thought to belong to Scholasticismmany thinkers maintained the absolute necessity of the Incarnation, seeing Christ as the culmination of creation and the absolute perfection to which human nature necessarily tends. The history of medieval philosophy can not ignore such attempts to conceive of rnan as the dynamic bond which strives to join spiritual and material reality. These attempts were made in accordance with an understanding of human knowledge and a conception of nature which was different from that of the proponents of the notion of a Christian philosophy, but they enable us to appreciate the continuity which exists between Anselm's idea of the maximum and the Renaissance conception of the dignitas hominis.
Llull's distinction between necessary activity ad intra and contingent activity ad extra was also crucial for his idea of man. In accordance with his conception of the tnediate place of the incarnate Christ between the first cause and its effect, he defined rnan by way of his relationship both to God and to the world.
With respect to creation, Llull held that rnan is a «microcosm>>. Although he was referring to the traditional motif which saw rnan as a world in miniature, he modified the traditional understanding of this idea radically. Man is a microcosm, not because he comprises in himself al1 the different degrees of reality and thus is subject to al1 its antagonistic forces, but rather because he forms the center of creation, uniting in himself the lowest level of intellectual reality and the highest reach of sensible being and is thus a bond which holds creation together.
With respect to the creator, nlan is himself creative ad extra, bringing forth ideas, instruments, tools and works of art. In producing tools and works of art, rnan uses matenals he finds in nature, but the forms he gives them are not mere imitations of natural things. They are true productions of his own mind. Man' s creative power thus approaches that of God. But whereas God brings forth as real beings the things that he understands, man's mind is not able to produce real beings, it can only represent them and appropriate them to itself.
The metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent activity was fundamental for Llull's understanding of man, above al1 because it enabled him to analyze more profoundly the nature of human knowledge. He had maintained rhat things like fire and whiteness have their own necessary, intrinsic and proper correlatives of action, whereas their obiects ad extra (earth or water, this os that hody) are contingent, extrinsic and appropriated to them.
In the very important late work De potentia, obiecto et actu Llull drew the consequences of this idea for human knowledge. The sensible things which the mind encounters in the world are not necessary objects of knowledge. Even the instruments and tools which the mind itself produces are objects appropriated by the mind to itself. The proper object of the mind must be an interior reality. Just as the proper object of fire is not earth or water, but rather fire itself as ignitable, so also the proper object of the mind can only be the mind itself as knowable.
To discover its true self, the mind must withdraw from the othemess and contingency which is involved in sense perception and rational knowledge. The mind must tum inward. It must tum away from its contingent activity ad extra and ascend to its own necessary, intrinsic dynamism.
The condition of the mind's return to itself is a deliberate, prior choice. Man' S ultimate autonomy is grounded not only in his faculties of knowledge, but also in his abiIity freely to choose. Through his faculties of knowledge rnan can comprehend al1 things; through his freedom he can become al1 things. He has the ability to choose to belong to himself, to free himself from the world and realize al1 the interior potentialities of his nature.
In thus reflecting on himself, rnan becomes a proper object of knowledge for himself. Since the knowledge of an object presupposes a disposition in the object enabling it to be known, rnan thus discovers himself as knowable. To explain that necessary process of human knowledge ad intra, Llull tumed to his theory of the correlatives of action: the knower (intelligens) knows himself as knowable object (intelligibile) in the activity of knowing (intelligere). This triadic structure does not imply a splitting up of rnan into three separate entities. Man knows himself as knowable, but relates this knowable object to himself.
At the same time, rnan becomes conscious of his own finitude. His knowledge is limited not only because it has to have recourse to sensible images. In order to understand the things which the mind discovers in the world -things which are in constant process, tending to their own perfection-it must reduce them to the static categories of discursive reason. Even its knowledge of those things brought forth by its own creativity is restricted because its ideas can only be realized in an alien matter.
Above all, however, it is in his effort to discover himself that rnan is, -confronted with the limitations of his nature. Although he must free himself from exterior things to find himself, the nature of his mind compels him to go out to exterior things before he can begin to return inwardly to himself.
From this vantage-point it is easy to appreciate the originality of Llull's Logica nova, a work which belongs to the period of the Ars generalis ultima. The logic of this work is new because it is meant to be a logic of pure knowing, a logic whose first intention is to consider the intellectual things which are the proper object of the intellect. It is only in a second intention that the new logic must consider the appropriated objects of the intellect, the ideas which the intellect abstracts from sensible things.
Reflecting Llull's idea of an intellectual ascent, the second figure of the Ars generalis ultinza distinguishes three degrees of knowledge: sensible knowledge of sensible things, intellectual knowledge of sensible things, and intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. Since the Logica nova was conceived as a logic for the third degree of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of intellectual things, it is at the same time a critique of the traditional logic and the theory of knowledge on which it was based. For Llull, Aristotle's logic was deficient because it limited itself to the intellectual knowledge of sensible things.
It is true that in the twelfth century certain thinkers recognized the possibility of a logic for the intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. Following Boethius, they distinguished between «itztelligibiliu», that is, the objects of the second degree of knowledge, and «intellectibilia», those of the third degree. But the thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle focused attention on the formulation of a logic of the second degree of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of sensible things, and precluded an attempt to analyze the conditions of its possibility. This is the reason why Llull's prologue to the Logica novu speaks of the unstable character of the traditional logic and proposes to reconstruct it on a new foundation, that of the third degree of knowledge. Because it concerns intellectual knowledge of intellectual things, Llull spoke of this highest degree of knowledge as a «natural» manner of knowing. Making use of his distinction between the necessary and the contingent correlatives of action, he regarded intellectual things as the necessary, intrinsic, proper objects of knowledge and criticized the traditional logic as one which treats only «peregrine» knowledge; the knowledge of contingent, extrinsic, appropriated objects, the sensible things encountered in this world.
Man's true nature is spiritual and tumed to intellectible things. But he must go out to corporeal reality and appropriate to himself sensible things in order to be able to retum to his proper self. Corporeal things -the subjects of the Art, imaginativa, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa-are al1 only instruments for man's realization of reason in the world. This is the reason why the Logica nova situates man on the border-line between spiritual and corporeal reality.
Man's proper function -as homificans animal in the enigmatic definition of the Logica nova-is the hominization of the animal, vegetable, and elemental kingdoms, and through them of the whole univers. Man is man not only because he seeks to approach ever more closely his abstract essence as animal rationale, but also because he seeks the complete transformation of his genus. The individual strives upward to the species, the species to the genus, and the genus to the original cosmic unity which is made up of universal form and universal matter.
Man is a microcosm, a bond joining spiritual and corporeal reality, because the tivum of his rational nature is able to appropriate to itself the various subjects which make up the universe. But the condition of the possibility of this appropriated knowledge lies in the proper, third degree of knowledge for which the Logica nova is meant.
In his reflection on himself, man thus achieves a new modesty, a modesty which gives birth to the realization that there must exist-beyond his own contracted -bile an absolute -tivum which is not only the origin and source, but also the end and perfection of al1 things. There is no comparison possible between the divine -tivum and the human -bile. But because God himself is the condition of the encounter between himself and man his transcendence is not infringed upon by being taken up in the process of human knowledge. The triadic structure of the necessary, intrinsic mode of understanding permits union without identification.
God is knowable. not as are the exterior things which are the contingent objects of human knowledge. He is the complementary part of the process of knowledge which takes place in the meeting of two subjects, each of whom experiences himself as knower and known, while both are united in the activity of knowing. Because God is himself intellect -intelligens intelligibile, irztelligel-e-the created intellect can attain union with him and beatitude.
The condition of this union is that man be in complete possession of himself. He must freely respond to God's knowability. Through his free choice of himself, man is able, to transcend sense impressions and rational concepts and attain the superlative One in whom al1 perfections fa11 together.
Man realizes himself, al1 the interior potentialities of his nature, in this union. The triadic structure of his knowledge makes him an image of God. In his encounter with the exemplar -a transcendent exemplar which is the beginning, middle, and end of his striving-man arrives at the ciynamic repose which is the activity of knowing. The measure of his own truth is the degree of intensity with which he reflects the divine exemplar. The gulf which separates exemplar and image, God and man, could only be bridged if God himself assumed human nature and elevated it to a maximum perfection.
Llull's conception of Christ as the God-man gives us the key to his understanding of the created world. In the incarnate Christ his conception of the universe reaches its culmination. The full perfection of the universe demands the union of creator and creature. This does not imply that Christ is a mediate nature between divinity and humanity, but rather that in his person the divine nature and the created nature of the universe are brought together.
Christ is the bond joining God and the world, because as an individual he is the fulfillment of al1 the interior potentialities of the species and through him the human species is the fulfillment of the universe. In his human nature he is the supreme limit of the active striving of al1 nature to its perfection and in his divine nature he is the perfect image of the Father.
